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The government has adopted an 
emergency housing policy to cater 
for people who may fi nd themselves 
in situations similar to that of the 
Grootboom community. Whether 
this policy is being implemented 
is another issue.
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in the Department of Public and 
Comparative Law at Makerere 
University, Uganda.
This article is extracted from a 
paper that is to appear in the 
South African Law Journal.
The paper is based on Mbazira’s 
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Judicial remedies and socio-economic 
rights
A response to Christopher Mbazira
David Bilchitz
Christopher Mbazira has produced a lucid, well-researched and thorough study of judicial remedies in cases concerning socio-economic rights. This response seeks to engage 
critically with Mbazira’s claims by raising certain questions and issues stimulated by his work 
that could be developed further.
Mbazira seeks to investigate 
the normative underpinnings of 
judicial remedies and contends 
that there are two main models 
in this regard: fi rst, the model of 
corrective justice and second, 
the model of distributive justice. 
Corrective justice, he argues, 
is linked to the philosophy of 
libertarianism, while distributive 
jus t ice i s  supported by the 
philosophy of utilitarianism.
The problem with strong binary 
oppositions is that, although they can 
be theoretically illuminating, they 
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are rarely as rigid as they appear. 
Mbazira’s theoretical framework 
appears to me to create an overly 
strong distinction between these 
two models. Certain ways in which 
he characterises these models may 
also be disputed.
First, corrective justice seeks to 
correct wrongs that have been 
done. When we are dealing with 
socio-economic rights, we are 
talking about wrongs in relation to 
the distribution of social goods and 
resources. The notion of “corrective 
justice” is thus premised upon the 
idea that there is some moral order 
in terms of which the “wrong” is 
defi ned. It is thus arguable that in 
order to determine what needs 
correction, one needs a theory 
of distributive justice in the first 
place. Corrective justice may thus 
be parasitic upon a theory of 
distributive justice in the context 
of wrongs that relate to individuals 
who have insuffi cient resources.
Secondly, distributive justice in 
political philosophy generally refers 
to the distribution of benefi ts and 
burdens among individuals. There 
are different theories as to what 
distribution of resources may be 
regarded as just. It is not accurate 
to see all forms of distributive justice 
as premised upon utilitarian theory. 
Rather, utilitarianism is a particular 
theory of distributive justice which 
defi nes a just distribution as one 
which produces the greatest 
amount of happiness (or utility) 
for the greatest number.
This theory has been subjected to 
a number of telling criticisms. Rawls, 
for instance, points out that the 
utilitarian principle is not primarily 
concerned with the distribution of 
happiness among individuals: the 
aggregating focus of the principle 
can thus leave some very badly off, 
provided the general happiness 
is maximised. Thus if neoliberal 
economic policies promote the 
general welfare but leave some 
very badly off, utilitarianism could 
promote such policies, and yet we 
may think it is incorrect to do so.
Rawls famously sets out an 
alternative theory of distributive 
justice in his book A theory of 
justice. He outlines two principles 
of justice: a distribution will be 
just, according to his theory, if it 
provides equal liberty rights to 
everyone and if it only allows for 
inequality in social and economic 
resources where such inequalities 
are to the benefit of the least 
advantaged. Rights-based theories 
– such as that of Rawls – seek to 
avoid the utilitarian problem by 
ensuring that individuals at least 
have certain basic rights and 
resources that they do not lose.
Libertarianism is traditionally 
regarded as a rights-based theory 
of a kind that posits certain strong 
negative rights. In Nozick’s most 
famous modern version of this theory, 
a just distribution is one in which 
every individual is entitled to hold 
the resources they possess. Nozick 
outlines principles of acquisition 
and transfer that provide for 
when entitlements are legitimate. 
Corrections to existing distributions 
are generally only legitimate 
where they arise from fraudulent 
or coercive transactions.
Thus, for Nozick, there is an 
existing set of entitlements that 
exhaust the claims of distributive 
justice. Corrective justice is really 
only a form of distributive justice 
in that it is a method of making 
good unjust distributions. For 
instance, given the unjust removal 
of many black people from their 
land in South Africa, land reform 
is required as a form of corrective 
justice that would aim to repair the 
injustices perpetrated in the past.
Thus it seems to me that the 
distinction between corrective 
and distributive justice is by 
no means clear-cut and the 
relationship between them needs 
to be developed further. This is of 
importance to Mbazira’s broad 
thesis in relation to judicial remedies 
for the following reason. Social 
rights, as Mbazira recognises, 
general ly  ra ise d is t r ibutive 
questions which can be related 
to different possible philosophical 
foundations (and not simply a 
utilitarian theory). The particular 
distributive theory one adopts 
could perhaps have an impact on 
the nature of the remedies that will 
be provided by courts.
This is perhaps an area for 
future research. Do the remedies 
that are given by courts support 
a particular version of distributive 
justice? Would one theory of 
distributive justice require more 
stringent or different remedies from 
others? It is perhaps arguable that 
a Rawlsian approach (focusing on 
the worst off) might require more 
interventionist remedies, such as 
the structural injunction, than a 
purely utilitarian approach would. 
However, this requires further 
investigation.
I t  a lso seems to me that 
there are at least two possible 
justifi cations for ensuring that social 
rights are realised in South Africa. 
First, there is a type of “corrective 
justification” which suggests 
that socio-economic rights are 
essentially in the Constitution to 
correct the injustices of apartheid, 
ESR Review vol 9 no 111
FEATURE
The courts 





rights and then 







which sought to deprive a large 
segment of the population of land 
and resources as well as other 
rights. What we should seek to do, 
according to this approach, is to 
correct these historical injustices. 
Socio-economic rights provide 
one way of ensuring that each 
individual gets at least a certain 
amount of resources to correct the 
wrongs of prior deprivation. Such 
an approach, it seems, would be 
focused on the historical wrongs 
of apartheid and particularly 
upon previously disadvantaged 
groups.
Another more “universalistic 
justification” for socio-economic 
rights recognises that they are 
based in the fundamental interests 
of all individuals, a justifi cation I 
have sought to develop in my 
book (Bilchitz, 2007). A society 
that seeks to treat individuals 
with equal importance or dignity, 
I argue, must recognise that each 
is entitled at least to a certain 
amount of resources with which 
to live their lives. I believe it is 
important for such an approach 
to distinguish between a minimum 
core threshold (or the most urgent 
needs of a being) and a higher 
threshold that should be realised 
progressively. Thus, in the context 
of housing, each individual would 
be entitled to at least shelter from 
the elements, which could then 
be developed over time so as to 
provide a more extensive form of 
state-subsidised housing.
At times Mbazira suggests that 
the resource implications of socio-
economic rights are too great for 
such rights to be realised. This, 
though, does not seem justified 
empirically, particularly if only 
a minimum package of goods is 
required initially. The universalistic 
approach may also have an 
impact on the kinds of remedies 
a court will develop and the level 
of intrusiveness of the remedies. 
I therefore agree with Mbazira’s 
argument that the 
content of rights and 
the nature of judicial 
remedies need to be 
tied closely together.
I have one more 
point to make about 
the individual istic 
nature of distributive 
remedies. Mbazira 
say s  t ha t  s o c i o -
e c o n o m i c  r i g h t s 
require a consideration 
o f  c o l l e c t i ve  o r 
societal interests. This 
is perhaps infl uenced 
by his understanding 
of distributive justice 
a s  l i n ked  to  t he 
“general happiness”. 
Yet it seems that these notions are 
not so apposite in this context. 
What Mbazira is acutely aware 
of and draws our attention to is 
that remedies in socio-economic 
rights cases cannot be ordered 
in isolation, for one individual, 
without the impact on others also 
being considered.
This is perhaps the major fl aw 
in the approach of the Brazilian 
courts. Essentially, for example, 
when an individual comes to court 
requesting medication, the courts 
order that the medication be 
provided. Those orders, however, 
distort the budget to such an 
extent that other individuals 
cannot acquire the life-saving 
medicines. The point is that an 
order for one individual will impact 
on other individuals. This is why 
it is necessary to adopt a more 
holistic view that embraces the 
wider impact of a case on a range 
of individuals.
However, it is equally impor-
tant to resist the rhetoric that 
socio-economic rights 
exist at the “societal” 
or “general” level. We 
also need to be wary 
of the notion that a 
“societal” or “col-
lective” interest can 
limit these rights. The 
interests protected by 
socio-economic rights 
remain those of indi-
viduals: what collec-
tive interest can be 
more important than 
ensuring individuals 
in a community do 
not starve or dehy-
drate?
Socio-economic 
rights, therefore, are 
essentially individual rights that 
nevertheless need to be considered 
in light of the equal importance of 
all individuals in the community. 
Such a consideration should not 
prevent courts from intervening in 
cases, nor overwhelm them with the 
complexity of the determinations 
in issue. The courts should rather 
seek to adopt principled normative 
standards towards these rights 
and then give effect to those 
standards by adopting workable, 
effective and creative remedies. 
This perhaps provides a good 
reason for the use in this context of 
structural injunctions which allow 
for the expertise and participation 
of other branches of government 
in devising just outcomes.
Mbazira has completed an 
impressive work that will help 
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our judges (and the academic 
community) think through the 
underlying assumptions as to which 
remedies should best be deployed 
in particular instances. He has 
worked on what is perhaps one 
of the most important elements 
of making socio-economic rights 
really count: namely, the very 
implementation of these rights. 
Hopefully, recent academic work 
on the normative content of socio-
economic rights, together with this 
important work on remedies, will 
have the result that socio-economic 
rights no longer just exist on paper, 
but are translated into reality for 
the countless individuals who need 
their protection.
David Bilchitz is a senior 
researcher at the South 
African Institute for Advanced 
Constitutional, Public, Human 
Rights and International Law 
and a visiting senior research 
fellow at the University of the 
Witwatersrand.
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The constitutional protection of those 
facing eviction from “bad buildings”
Lilian Chenwi and Sandra Liebenberg
The judgment gives effect to South 
Africa’s constitutional commitment 
to housing rights. It also affi rms the 
obligation on local authorities, in 
all evictions, to seek reasonable 
ways to avoid homelessness by 
engaging meaningfully with the 
affected communities.
Central to this case are the 
provisions of the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards 
Act 103 of 1977 (NBRA), which 
empower local authority offi cials 
to issue a notice to occupiers to 
vacate premises when they deem 
it necessary for the safety of any 
person (section 12(4)(b)). Failure 
to comply with such a notice 
constitutes a criminal offence for 
which the offender can be fi ned 
up to R100 for each day of non-
compliance (section 12(6)).
Facts and decisions of 
lower courts
This case began in the High Court, 
where the City of Johannesburg 
(the City), relying upon section 
12(4)(b) of the NBRA, sought the 
eviction of over 300 people from 
six properties in the inner city 
on health and safety grounds 
(City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2006 (6) BCLR 728 (W)). Section 
12(4)(b) is in fact regularly used in 
Johannesburg to clear residents 
of what the City regards as 
residential “sinkholes” or “bad 
buildings”.
The occupiers opposed the 
eviction order and brought a 
counter-application aimed at 
securing alternative accommoda-
tion or housing as a precondition 
to their eviction. Judge Jajbhay 
held that the City’s housing pro-
gramme failed to comply with its 
constitutional and statutory ob-
ligations, and ordered the City 
to produce a programme to ca-
ter for those in desperate need. 
Pending the implementation of 
the programme or the provision of 
suitable adequate alternative ac-
commodation, the eviction of the 
occupiers could not take place.
The City then appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) against the High Court’s 
The Constitutional Court’s judgment in the Olivia case, handed down on 19 February 2008, represents a 
v ic tory for  the occup iers  of  “bad-bu i ld ings”  in 
the inner city of Johannesburg as well as other poor people 
facing eviction for health and safety reasons.
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, 
Berea Township, and 197 Main 
Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and Others CCT 
24/07 (Olivia case)
 This case has been 
discussed in previous issues 
of the ESR Review: 7(2), 8(1) 
and 8(3).
